In this brief, we explore practices and processes by which information should be exchanged between knowledge actors and policy-makers with the intention to produce scientifically informed policies in Europe. We can see an increasing prominence of science in many public debates and the increasing willingness of governments to mobilize scientific and other advice mechanisms in the context of public debate.

The aim of science for policy is to produce actionable science, however, the level of control over those producing the knowledge and their responsibility for the consequences of the action is a matter of important societal dispute. Debates and interactions in the political and public space encompass interest-driven channels of communication, including scientific advice but also lay knowledge.

Therefore, science for policy needs to integrate knowledge from different sources and this requires building connections and relationships between actors from different scientific disciplines and across public administrations, affecting both the nature of science and the nature of policy-making. Science for policy may face adjustments in its modes of operation and its formats of interaction, which – at times – may well be at odds with the dominant empirical-analytical perception of science.

We make a deep dive into developments which are currently underway in the realm of research and innovation policy, and which can take us to different futures, including events largely unpredictable and decisions bound by constraints of diverse nature. We identify possible policy implications based on five scenarios of the future (in 2030), which highlight different types of science for policy ecosystems:

• Scenario A on societal-challenge-driven and mission-oriented research and policy provides the context for advice mechanisms to policy. Such a context can be amenable for scientific advice but it also entails risks for science.
• Scenario B on participatory science and policy support ‘under construction’ opens up the discussion on broadening the sources of evidence; why and how to include new types of actors beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (well-connected experts). This has implications for how to promote science and develop the policy support system. 
• Scenario C on data enthusiasm and AI overtaking scientific policy advice illustrates the role of data, AI and international governance challenges and it alarms about over-reliance on multinational data providers, which may lead to a loss of transparency, autonomy and (normative) reflection in scientific advice. We should ask whether technology can be neutral, and whether scientific advice can be normative. 
• Scenario D on open science and policy support points out that open science is not the same as open scientific advice whereby experts can speak frankly. Useful scientific advice has characteristics of a protected space where also unpopular (but well-founded) opinions can be voiced. 
• Scenario E on policy-based evidence-making in incumbent-driven industrial policy increases weight on advice mechanisms and embedding data, evidence, and experimentation within government agencies, and government research and regulatory organisations. 

The study focuses geographically on Europe and looks toward 2050, on regimes of stewardship of land and sea and address the role of ownership, access and use rights in rural areas (cities excluded), multiple uses of spaces (both land and sea), biodiversity, food (both aquaculture, fisheries and agriculture), energy (use of renewables), raw materials (mining etc.), carbon removal and storage, adaptation to climate change. While the challenges are global, they are addressed especially from the European research and innovation policy perspective. 

The immense social and technological evolution of the Anthropocene continues transforming the Earth’s surface and its dynamics through extensive (mis-)use of its resources, both on the land and in the sea. This policy brief develops scenarios on rural and marine areas in Europe in 2050 and subsequent implications to today’s R&I policy in Europe. Each scenario considers i) Economy and technology, ii) Demographics, lifestyles and values, iii) Governance and iv) Environment.

In Scenario A, European Civic Ecovillages pursue self-sufficiency and contribute to establishing a cooperative, locally oriented, caring economy restoring the ecosystem carrying capacities in land and sea. In Scenario B on Sustainable High-tech Europe, European businesses enjoy global leadership in regenerative and multi-functional high-tech solutions for energy, aquaculture and agriculture. In Scenario C on the United States of Europe, centrally planned Europe is divided between intensive use of land and sea and large conservation areas. Scenario D on European Permacrisis portrays Europe in a post-growth and politically scattered context that leads to low rates of innovation and fragmented use of land and sea.

None of the scenarios features a decisive solution to the global climate and biodiversity crises. Scenario A forcefully targets the resolution of the biodiversity crisis in Europe, by aligning human practices with nature, but provides little support to global climate and biodiversity crises. Scenario B proactively tackles the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and internationally but struggles with the fragmentation of efforts and with scaling up good practices and wider impact to curb the crisis. Scenarios C and D with intensive use of nature reduce biodiversity. Thanks to European-wide coordination Scenario C can protect vast areas with positive impacts to biodiversity, whereas Scenario D also struggles with the major fragmentation of conservation efforts and its detrimental impact on biodiversity. Such challenges illustrate the importance of balanced approaches in developing both local and global solutions to climate and biodiversity crises.

All scenarios depict a future of rural and marine areas in the context of extreme weather events and ecological crises, all be it with different intensities. Social developments, instead, range from major social confrontations to more collaborative and inclusive practices. Their policy implications include, among others, the need to address major risks of patchy land use that hamper the sufficient size of ecosystems and diminish resilience. The scenarios also touch upon integrated spatial planning of urban, rural and marine areas, and how the effective use of spaces can benefit from the further extension of user rights. Future research could explore if and how land ownership models in some rural areas could be replaced or complemented with public ownership and user rights. Furthermore, policy implications include a need for balancing sustainability with food affordability and security in different modalities of agriculture and aquaculture. The challenges of climate and biodiversity crises addressed by the scenarios suggest that balanced approaches are needed in developing both local and global solutions.

This brief is the result of one of eight Deep Dive Foresight Studies in the project ‘European R&I Foresight and Public Engagement for Horizon Europe’ conducted by the Foresight on Demand’ consortium for the European Commission. During the spring of 2023, an expert team identified factors of change and organised two scenario and one policy implications workshops also engaging experts from academia, business and public administration around Europe. The process was also supported by discussions in the Horizon Europe Foresight Network.

Stories and narratives are a powerful tool of Futures Literacy and Futures Thinking. In recent years, they have been fighting for attention next to scenarios and trend research within the Foresight discipline, and there is a good reason for it. Adding up to 21 stories, the narratives in this booklet deal with the planetary emergency, the existential threat of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, which are driving the European Green Deal. They were built on ideas by people from all around the world. Some were experts in the field, some purely engaged citizens with a story to tell. Stories from 2050 range from plausible sci-fi stories of the future to fictional fairy tales that provoke abstract thinking. Some stories are hopeful; others are concerning. They are going to stimulate your thinking by providing different perspectives and layers of understanding.

Innovation is changing in several dimensions. First, the initially closed innovation processes are complemented by various forms of open innovation. Second, consequently, innovation is not only performed by companies, but other actors, like users or non-governmental organisations get involved. Third, the dominance of product innovation based on hardware components is not only complemented but also partly substituted by digital components including software. Finally, the initially envisaged impact of innovation on firms and countries; economic success has been significantly widened in its contribution to sustainable development. Consequently, the existing IP regime is challenged by both its processes and its products, the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).

We explore how these changes in several dimensions of innovation might influence the IP regimes, its processes, and products, including their implementation and impacts in the future.

Climate change and environmental degradation are an existential threat to the European Union and to the world. As a response, among other things, the European Green Deal aims to make Europe climate-neutral by 2050, boost the economy through green technology, create sustainable industry and transport, and cut pollution. The transition towards greener and more sustainable economies is a game changer in the EU labour market alongside digitalisation and automation. Skill needs will change with impacts far beyond the key occupations driving them, affecting all economic sectors.

Europe needs to promote and support green employment, address the skilling and reskilling of workers, and anticipate changes in workplaces of the future. In order to get a better grasp on potential future outcomes, and better anticipate their potential policy implications, a foresight Deep Dive has been carried out. The Deep Dive uses a broad conceptualization of skills that encompasses the full palette from scientific and engineering skills to vocational and crafts-like skills. All are needed in the green labour market, although the scenario-led focus here for the most part is on skills of vocational professions. This policy brief presents the main findings.

A set of four different scenarios for the futures of green skills and jobs in Europe in 2050 were crafted:

• Scenario A: Green technology-intensive Europe: Struggling to fill all the green jobs
• Scenario B: Apocalypse Soon: Fighting skills mismatches in a degraded environment
• Scenario C: Feeling the pain: A workforce left behind in a non-green world
• Scenario D: Green leapfrogging: Old, mismatched Europe surrounded by new green giants

Climate change impacts are one of the main threats to human society and natural ecosystems. Even though natural dynamics also have a substantial effect on climate, there is no doubt that current alterations of climate with the correlated impacts are manmade. Alongside continuing efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change, there may be possibilities to geoengineer climate systems to reduce or mask the impacts of climate change. There are also strong arguments for large-scale changes in social practices for adapting to and mitigating climate change. The big challenge comes with the necessary scale of interventions as those changes need to be large-scale and global, putting new challenges to all levels of governance from local to global.

Many present drivers seem to indicate a gloomy future for the climate. The current individualistic mindsets drive overconsumption and overproduction. The offsetting of carbon emissions is sometimes used to compensate for dirty activities. Intense competition for natural resources is not safeguarding their sustainability. Bio-holistic worldviews confront anthropocentric views, but climate delay has emerged as the new denial and the lack of courage to address climate supremacists, i.e. the global wealthy, shows little change of direction. According to a 2020 report from Oxfam and the Stockholm Environment Institute, the wealthiest top 1% were responsible for 15% of global emissions, nearly twice as much as the world’s poorest 50%, who were responsible for just 7%. Overly optimistic beliefs in tech or social transformation to solve it prevail, and there is a wide reluctance to consider broad system change.

There are also drivers towards desired futures. Improved understanding of climate and global change and the capacity and knowledge to purposefully shape nature and society provide better means to address climate change. Climate anxiety and perception of government inaction have triggered, for instance, the ‘Fridays for future’ movement, which contributes to the emergence of global conscience on the climate and biodiversity crisis and the need for justice. New understandings of human purpose and fairness also encourage the development of a wider range of responses like de-desertification, seaweed permaculture, ocean fertilization, carbon capture and storage, and solar radiation management. We may learn to protect the global commons, including indigenous cultures and atmospheric commons.

Economic growth in societies based on individual material gain, here-and-now-thinking, short political cycles, and lack of broad political agreement on alternative paths seem to keep us on the path to the climate crisis. Furthermore, exacerbated social inequalities may lead many to have no willingness or ability to participate in transitions. While we are overconfident with systems’ design, we underestimate natural forces and ecosystems. Emerging options for large-scale ‘geoengineering’ interventions in the climate system promise new opportunities and new risks, including novel geopolitical tensions.There are diverse perceptions on geoengineering and possible social change towards potential acceptance or societal rejection. The planet lacks a fair and appropriate governance structure providing a framework on who might be entitled to carry out geoengineering projects in the name of the planet and what their responsibility is. There is no sufficient dialogue on what it means to be a responsible company, researcher, research organisation, or policy-maker in this context.

This deep dive is part of the Foresight towards the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe project.