Foresight on Demand (FOD) is a rapid foresight response mechanism organised in a framework contract, and aims at providing quick forward-looking inputs to policymaking by leveraging the best available foresight knowledge. It addresses the growing need for quicker and more responsive foresight to inform policymaking in an increasingly turbulent environment.

Representatives of all twenty FOD partner organisations and representatives of different client authorities met in person during a lunch-to-lunch meeting in Brussels taking place at IDEA consult premises from October 10 to October 11, 2024.

47 people participated in the meeting that focussed on getting to know all FOD partners, especially the new partner organisations of FOD II, gaining insights on expectations of client authorities, as well as on updating the FOD consortium on ongoing and upcoming requests and discussing the FOD service provision processes. The meeting offered the opportunity to exchange in group discussions, during the FOD partner art gallery, where partners presented their organisations and services through art pieces and creative work, and informally during lunch, coffee and at the social dinner.

The meeting revealed inspiring insights on lessons learned during FOD I (2019-2023), on promoting the FOD framework for potential projects, as well as on emerging topics potentially relevant to the current FOD II (2024-2028) period.

We focus on alternative futures of Europe, on regimes of stewardship of land and sea and address the role of ownership, access and use rights in rural areas (cities excluded), multiple uses of spaces (both land and sea), biodiversity, food (both aquaculture, fisheries and agriculture), energy (use of renewables), raw materials (mining etc.), carbon removal and storage, adaptation to climate change. While the challenges are global, they are addressed especially from the European research and innovation policy perspective.

This is the final report from a foresight study that aimed at supporting the development of the Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe (2025-2027). The study lasted for 18 months and involved a wide range of activities that this report aims at presenting.

These activities aimed at providing early-stage strategic intelligence and sense-making contributions – issues, trends, perspectives, ideas - that could contribute novel elements to the more structured processes of strategic planning that were to follow. The work followed two important directions that were recommended by EFFLA (2012)1 as core elements of bringing foresight into EU R&I policy: knowledge-based review and broad engagement.

Knowledge based review was conducted with the help of the 40 experts who constituted the team that worked on the project. All these experts have contributed as authors to the authorship of the different chapters of this report. About 300 additional experts contributed to the project through its numerous workshops that helped shape the scenarios and ideas about their policy implications, and through membership in the on-line platform of the project at www.futures4europe.eu, which reached 307 people. Last, we acknowledge the 943 experts who responded to our final consultation survey on the implications of our foresight for the directions of EU R&I policy.

The foresight process
The foresight process in support of the 2nd Strategic Plan comprised a wide spectrum of activities:
• As a reference point for the exploratory work, the explicit and implicit impact assumptions of the 1st Strategic Plan were identified and visualised with the help of a qualitative system analysis and modelling tool for causal loop analysis.
• An exploratory analysis of forward-looking sources (e.g. foresight reports, web-based horizon scanning) was conducted to identify relevant trends and signals of unexpected developments. These were discussed in online workshops and on www.futures4europe.eu.
• An outlook on emerging developments in the global and European context of EU R&I policy was developed drawing on a major online workshop in autumn 2021 with some 60 participants, experts and policy makers, who worked with multi-level context scenarios and specific context narratives about emerging disruptions.
• On that basis and in close consultation with the European Commission involving another major workshop in February 2022 which brought together 80 participants, Expert Teams were set up to develop disruptive scenarios in five areas of major interest. Each team ran several internal workshops but also involved further experts and Commission staff in their work, both through the online platform and through a final policy-oriented workshop. The foresight work within the areas of interest resulted in five deep dives on the following topics:
> Climate change, Research, and Innovation: Radical Options from Social Change to Geoengineering
> Hydrogen Economy – A radical alternative
> The EU in a Volatile New World - The challenge of global leadership
> Global Commons
> Transhumanist Revolutions
• Further areas of interest identified since were explored through review papers aiming to capture major trends, developments and scenario sketches in relation to further disruptive developments
> Social Confrontations
> Artificial General Intelligence: Issues and Opportunities
> The Interpenetration of Criminal and Lawful Economic Activities
> The Future of Health
• A third major workshop took place in October 2022 bringing together all the thematic strands of work and addressing possible R&I policy implications from this work. Participation in this workshop reached 250 individuals over 2 days.
• Building on the workshop, the online Dynamic Argumentative Delphi survey Research4Futures collect suggestions from further experts and citizens about the implications of this foresight work for the priorities of EU R&I policy.

This foresight study has been the most widely engaging foresight exercise yet aiming to support EU R&I policy. Through this broad engagement, the study did not only develop intelligence for the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe but also contributed to the development of an EU R&I foresight community, one that is an asset for future R&I policies across Europe. 

undefined

The report outlines three scenarios of possible futures for Research and Innovation (R&I) policies in the Western Balkans in 2035. Using a Strategic Foresight approach, the report supports policy makers in creating an enabling environment for R&I policies to thrive and in deciding on priorities for strategic investments for the future. 

The scenarios in the report are based on an extensive co-creation process with more than 700 R&I experts from the Western Balkans, representing academia, civil society, the private sector, international organisations, and central and sub-national governments. To provide inspiration for the implementation of future-proof R&I policies, the report also includes initial roadmaps. 

These are designed to inspire decision-makers by setting targets and the actions needed to develop their R&I systems for the benefit of all citizens in the Western Balkans. The project was launched in July 2020 and the final study was presented at the EU-WB Ministerial Meeting in October 2021.

undefined

The evolving complexity of global challenges is increasingly affecting the steering of European Research and Innovation which aims at addressing important present and future societal concerns. The idea of ‘watching futures’ to anticipate future possibilities and analyse the consequences of current choices to inform and shape a forward-looking EU R&I policy is continuously gaining ground.

In this light, as part of the ‘European R&I foresight and public engagement for Horizon Europe’ study launched by the European Commission in connection to the Horizon Europe Foresight Network, a second series of online workshops will take place during October – November 2023.

The workshops, which will run for two hours each, will discuss insights stemming from thematic policy briefs compiled by expert panels, addressing possible future scenarios for critical issues (i.e., Interpretation of Criminal and Lawful Activities, Green Skills and Jobs, Big Tech, etc.). Following the presentation of each policy brief, each workshop will feature two focus groups: one involving the group of experts from the panel who developed the policy brief and one including representatives from topic-relevant EU-funded R&I projects. All events will foster extensive engagement with participants, including policymakers.

The evolving complexity of global challenges is increasingly affecting the steering of European Research and Innovation which aims at addressing important present and future societal concerns. The idea of ‘watching futures’ to anticipate future possibilities and analyse the consequences of current choices to inform and shape a forward-looking EU R&I policy is continuously gaining ground.

In this light, as part of the ‘European R&I foresight and public engagement for Horizon Europe’ study launched by the European Commission in connection to the Horizon Europe Foresight Network, a second series of online workshops will take place during October – November 2023.

The workshops, which will run for two hours each, will discuss insights stemming from thematic policy briefs compiled by expert panels, addressing possible future scenarios for critical issues (i.e., Interpretation of Criminal and Lawful Activities, Green Skills and Jobs, Big Tech, etc.). Following the presentation of each policy brief, each workshop will feature two focus groups: one involving the group of experts from the panel who developed the policy brief and one including representatives from topic-relevant EU-funded R&I projects. All events will foster extensive engagement with participants, including policymakers.

Root causes and structural conditions of social confrontations (ideological divisions, discrimination, inequalities in access to resources, environmental issues, etc.) both online and offline.

The evolving complexity of global challenges is increasingly affecting the steering of European Research and Innovation which aims at addressing important present and future societal concerns. The idea of ‘watching futures’ to anticipate future possibilities and analyse the consequences of current choices to inform and shape a forward-looking EU R&I policy is continuously gaining ground.

In this light, as part of the ‘European R&I foresight and public engagement for Horizon Europe’ study launched by the European Commission in connection to the Horizon Europe Foresight Network, a series of online workshops will take place during the Spring and early Summer of 2023.

These workshops, which will run for two hours each, will discuss insights stemming from thematic policy briefs compiled by expert panels, addressing possible future scenarios for critical issues (i.e., social confrontations, use and management of land and sea, science for policy, etc.). Each workshop will feature experts from the panels who developed the policy brief, guest speakers from relevant EU R&I projects and policy-makers, and will involve extensive engagement with participants.

The European foresight community has experienced remarkable growth in recent years. The newly published Eye of Europe report "Showcasing Perspectives: A Stocktaking of R&I Foresight Practices in Europe" provides an assessment of just that, namely the actors, preferred methodologies, success factors and bottlenecks for effective R&I foresight projects, as well as trends for future R&I foresight projects in Europe.

This stocktaking, carried out by the DLR Projektträger in the framework of the Eye of Europe project, is based on a comprehensive survey of 43 R&I foresight organisations in 16 ERA and four non-ERA countries. Interviews with renowned national foresight experts complement the findings. Similar response rates from government and academia, business and other organisations such as consultancies or NGOs allowed for a diverse snapshot of R&I foresight approaches in Europe.

Highlighting flagship projects

For the preparation of the study, European foresight actors submitted 54 different R&I foresight projects. These include projects that aim to anticipate technological and societal changes in order to inform national and regional R&I strategies and make them more robust, or foresight projects that address complex global issues such as climate change, cancer or sustainable food security. Others seek to understand new developments, such as the digital transformation, and analyse the social and economic impact of these changes, or to develop and design new products.

R&I foresight projects are not only carried out at European and national level. The report additionally highlights sub-national champions such as the Friuli Venezia Giulia region and Sardinia in Italy, the Helsinki-Uusimaa region in Finland, Ostbelgien and the Flemish government in Belgium, or Hauts-de-France, to show how they have used foresight methods to advance their R&I agendas.

What are critical success factors and bottlenecks for R&I foresight projects in Europe?

Here is what the R&I foresight experts believe contributed to the success of their projects: Top of the list of critical success factors - mentioned by almost all respondents - is high-level commitment and support from government representatives. Ensuring cross-sectoral stakeholder engagement was another frequently cited factor. Leveraging existing networks or databases of expertise was also cited as a critical success factor, as it enables the rapid mobilisation of the right experts. But how can we ensure that we reach the relevant people and keep them engaged?

Several R&I foresight experts stressed the importance of defining and communicating a clear purpose for the project and explaining why it is important and worth stakeholders' time, as well as demonstrating that foresight can add value in the context of today's R&I challenges. What can foresight achieve and what are its limitations? Transparency of methods also contributes to credibility. Facilitating direct interaction between participants in creative settings has the potential to be beneficial, allowing for more dynamic and contextually rich foresight outcomes. The R&I foresight experts noted that it is important to allow sufficient time for interactive discussions. Wherever possible, the setting should be face-to-face.

Yet, these R&I foresight projects have not always gone to plan. Bottlenecks identified include recurring ones such as insufficient time for comprehensive analysis and stakeholder engagement, or financial constraints that can prevent in-depth trend analysis and essential foresight activities. It can also be time-consuming to mobilise a diverse group of experts and policy-makers for participatory exercises, which can be a challenge in a time-critical project. Short-term thinking and a reluctance to challenge established beliefs can hinder the exploration of alternative futures and stifle innovative foresight efforts. Others reported the "impact gap" and their struggle to ensure that foresight results influence decision making, often exacerbated by an over-reliance on written summaries that lack engaging communication methods. Finally, maintaining objectivity in horizon-scanning activities and avoiding the pitfalls of techno-optimism can also be challenging.

What's next? Trends in R&I foresight

The report provides answers to those curious about the new frontiers and trends in the use of R&I foresight. Whether it's the integration of AI and machine learning technologies into foresight practices, the representation of future generations and nature in foresight processes, speculative and design-based approaches or debiasing techniques, the methods of R&I foresight are constantly evolving.

For those wishing to expand their networks, the report also provides an overview of international and European (R&I) foresight networks, national (R&I) foresight networks, networks focusing on technology assessment, and examples of regular (R&I) foresight conferences or conferences with sessions dedicated to R&I foresight.

This stocktaking report is a snapshot of the status quo of R&I foresight actors in Europe. However, new innovative projects are being implemented as you read this article. As the Eye of Europe project consortium, we are committed to strengthening fora for exchange among R&I practitioners interested in foresight methodologies. Let's continue the lively discussions on the Futures4Europe platform to shape tomorrow's R&I agendas together.

For more information, feel free to reach out to the author Simon Winter at simon.winter@dlr.de

Commissioned by the RCC, the DLR-PT study "Unleashing the Potential for Competitiveness: Trends in the Western Balkans". It presents trends that are likely to shape the region's competitiveness until 2035. It examines the potential impact on inclusive growth and provides examples that could be useful for the economies of the Western Balkans (WB). Based on desk research, expert interviews and an online trends workshop, the DLR-PT's Foresight team prepared the study in March and April 2023. It provides stakeholders with evidence-based insights to prepare for future developments and help formulate effective policy options and strategies. The study focuses on four key areas defined by the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2020: the enabling environment, human capital, markets and the innovation ecosystem. Through desk research, qualitative interviews and expert workshops, it identifies trends that provide a comprehensive view of the likely evolution of competitiveness over the next 12 years, enabling policymakers to anticipate future challenges. 

The study provides a methodological overview of Strategic Foresight and delves into the trends within the identified pillars, providing a summary of findings and recommendations for future action. By highlighting the trajectory of competitiveness and its implications, the study provides policymakers with valuable insights to effectively navigate the evolving landscape and foster sustainable growth in the Western Balkans.

Big Tech is rewiring the world. These very large private companies are leaders in research and development (R&D) and now wield unprecedented and unparalleled influence in the economy and beyhond. In this redefined world, Europe faces a number of agenda-setting questions. This policy brief aims to anticipate the implications of ‘Big Tech’ for Europe’s future by 2040.

The future(s) of Big Tech: Questions, challenges, strategies for Europe

Big Tech are here to stay. But they do not stay the same. They have a hunger for innovation. In terms of R&D, the top 5 US Big Tech spend in a single year more than the double of what the EU-27 committed collectively to the Horizon Europe, which runs for seven years. Big Tech corporates leverage cloud infrastructure, digital platform business models, and increasingly AI technologies to capture expansive market positions and to achieve superior performance. Another obvious fact is that these economic titans are not from Europe.

A set of questions thus suggest themselves: In a market-driven economy, does it matter for Europe? If it matters, will conventional remedies like regulation and competition policy be enough to cope with the ramifications? Is it time to go post-neoliberal phase and engage in informational industrial activism of a disruptive kind? Or, on the contrary, will bottom-up decentralised entrepreneurial incrementalism sort out any temporary European competitiveness and governance failures?

In a new report to the European Commission, these four questions are dealt with by means of a scenario-building exercise. Four authors, who also counted with inputs from 30 experts from industry and academia, make an attempt to anticipate how the European Union can regain its edge in a world re-wired by Big Tech.

Four scenarios put forward alternative challenges for the year 2040 from a Research & Innovation perspective (see Box). Scenario 1 ‘Winners Tech All’ is a world of high openness and mega-economies of scale and scope. In contrast, scenario 2 ‘Pax Technologica’ could be seen as a robustly negotiated multipolar environment. Scenario 3, ‘Re-matching’, envisions the recovery of a mixed tech economy where alternatives to incumbent Big Tech are viable. Finally, Scenario 4 is called ‘Closet Liberalism’and portrays a low-obstruction/wide-arena world where self-organised economic dynamics propel Europe back onto the global competitive map.

The policy implications are considered. The policy posture across scenarios and strategic stances for each scenario is rooted in three basic premises, i.e. the imperative to: protect pluralism (economic and societal), maintain a cosmopolitan outlook (in world affairs), and safeguard natural commons (including Earth and orbital resources). Based on these assumptions and the scenario analysis, number of strategic conclusions are drawn.

Out of the general and scenario-specific portfolios that were generated, a number headline policy options can be considered:

- The EU should reinforce and develop its own regulations and anti-monopolistic actions to constrain the market power of Big Tech Companies, but these are not sufficient to ensure autonomous economic development and well-being in the EU;

- It is needed that a new generation of European productive actors emerges to generate a productive capacity of the old continent in new infrastructuring fields, and if these are built as cross-European state-owned entities this is an option not to be disregarded.

- The EU Framework Programme and national research and innovation (R&I) budgets should be benchmarked not only against their past performance but also compared to the spending and strategies of Big Tech;

- ‘Big bet’ investments are needed in Europe, coupled with more serendipity-inducing experimental approaches.

Scenario sketches

Scenario 1: Winners tech all

This is a story of modernisation orchestrated around digital high-tech. The economy is not run by Big Tech but on infrastructures these private companies own and hone. Growing dependencies can be tolerated because benefits are shared and businesses are empowered to pursue their plans. The operating framework inherited from Globalisation assures a modicum of stability, namely informal institutions like the G7 or the G20 and formal institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. The US remains the sole superpower and maintains its role as agenda-setter. The room for manoeuvre for the EU is limited and it takes its place in the international division of labour.

Scenario 2: Pax technologica

The economy is a negotiated tension between pro-global business interests and pro-local (local referring to groups of countries with aligned interests cooperating and competing with each other, forming coopetitive clubs) political constraints. The drive to take advantage of economies of scale and scope has been tamed by enhanced regulation and hardened borders. Supply-chains are splintered and directed towards suppliers within the mega-regions composed of preferential partners, increasing costs but reducing uncertainty. Existing large tech firms must accommodate each other. Existing platform models are entrenched but are forced to grant access to their digital and logistic facilities, leading newcomers to not investing in their own subversive infrastructure. Stability is a value, not so much efficiency. The US retains its role as an economic-financial and political-military switchboard, but for a diminishing part of the globe. China is still challenging the dominance of the US both politically and economically. Other regional powers emerge. The EU is a switchboard of external and internal pressures, and this is the “Brussels Consensus”.

Scenario 3: Re-matching

What shapes the development of individual nations regions is their own path in a pluralist international scene. Pro-active productive policy makes sense, especially if coordinated among players. After years of blitz-scaling the tide turned, and Big Tech went into a fizzdown. Cross-regional/trans-sectoral innovative players gained mass and found expansive growth niches at key intersections of a complex (mix) economy with an active role of the public sector associated to national governments and international organizations. Commons governance generate citizen engagement and global fragmentation is controlled. An overstretched self-consumed US has to divide protagonism with other world powers. The EU is a network builder, it supports the catalysing and protection of the new core-inputs of the modernising economy.

Scenario 4: Closet liberalism

In this world commercial and financial integration proceeds and power continues to trespass national borders and overwhelm States. Large multinationals are seen to have a large impact in public governance, but tech monopolies matured becoming expensive and bad quality. There is a mesh of networks and competing authorities create an opportunity for decentralisation, especially at the local and city levels. The US serves its own interests and is more reluctant to assume its responsibilities in global public good provision. The EU preaches the superiority of the market order, but inside the EU everyone tries to re-interpret the rules of the game in its own benefit (fiscal responsibility is for the population not for businesses).

undefined

Climate change and environmental degradation are an existential threat to the European Union and to the world. As a response, among other things, the European Green Deal aims to make Europe climate-neutral by 2050, boost the economy through green technology, create sustainable industry and transport, and cut pollution. The transition towards greener and more sustainable economies is a game changer in the EU labour market alongside digitalisation and automation. Skill needs will change with impacts far beyond the key occupations driving them, affecting all economic sectors.

Europe needs to promote and support green employment, address the skilling and reskilling of workers, and anticipate changes in workplaces of the future. In order to get a better grasp on potential future outcomes, and better anticipate their potential policy implications, a foresight Deep Dive has been carried out. The Deep Dive uses a broad conceptualization of skills that encompasses the full palette from scientific and engineering skills to vocational and crafts-like skills. All are needed in the green labour market, although the scenario-led focus here for the most part is on skills of vocational professions. This policy brief presents the main findings.

A set of four different scenarios for the futures of green skills and jobs in Europe in 2050 were crafted:

• Scenario A: Green technology-intensive Europe: Struggling to fill all the green jobs
• Scenario B: Apocalypse Soon: Fighting skills mismatches in a degraded environment
• Scenario C: Feeling the pain: A workforce left behind in a non-green world
• Scenario D: Green leapfrogging: Old, mismatched Europe surrounded by new green giants

This study considers the interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities, with new technologies and unregulated terrains offering new opportunities for new types of interpenetration. We explore the possibility of differentiating, regulating, and controlling criminal and legal activities and markets, the level of control technically feasible and socially and economically desirable, among other relevant issues.  We analyse the following issues, among others:

• Is there a possibility of differentiating and controlling criminal and legal markets and economic activities? 
• What level of control is technically feasible and (at the same time) socially and economically desirable?  
• To some extent is it possible to establish the lawful origins of funds used in every transaction?  
  
  The study is relevant for several reasons:
• Crimes have wide-ranging, major impacts on the economy, society and environment, when connected to lawful economic activities.Quite often these connections (“interpenetrations”) are not detected  - or not reported for various reasons.
• Economic hardship and crises are likely to reinforce the incentives for committing criminal economic activities.
• New technologies might offer new opportunities for new or “refined” criminal economic activities.
• Economic criminals are often innovative and enter unregulated terrains (e.g.,some commons, metaverse, etc.).
• Lack of resources and skills to fight economic crime is a major hurdle.

In this brief, we explore practices and processes by which information should be exchanged between knowledge actors and policy-makers with the intention to produce scientifically informed policies in Europe. We can see an increasing prominence of science in many public debates and the increasing willingness of governments to mobilize scientific and other advice mechanisms in the context of public debate.

The aim of science for policy is to produce actionable science, however, the level of control over those producing the knowledge and their responsibility for the consequences of the action is a matter of important societal dispute. Debates and interactions in the political and public space encompass interest-driven channels of communication, including scientific advice but also lay knowledge.

Therefore, science for policy needs to integrate knowledge from different sources and this requires building connections and relationships between actors from different scientific disciplines and across public administrations, affecting both the nature of science and the nature of policy-making. Science for policy may face adjustments in its modes of operation and its formats of interaction, which – at times – may well be at odds with the dominant empirical-analytical perception of science.

We make a deep dive into developments which are currently underway in the realm of research and innovation policy, and which can take us to different futures, including events largely unpredictable and decisions bound by constraints of diverse nature. We identify possible policy implications based on five scenarios of the future (in 2030), which highlight different types of science for policy ecosystems:

• Scenario A on societal-challenge-driven and mission-oriented research and policy provides the context for advice mechanisms to policy. Such a context can be amenable for scientific advice but it also entails risks for science.
• Scenario B on participatory science and policy support ‘under construction’ opens up the discussion on broadening the sources of evidence; why and how to include new types of actors beyond the ‘usual suspects’ (well-connected experts). This has implications for how to promote science and develop the policy support system. 
• Scenario C on data enthusiasm and AI overtaking scientific policy advice illustrates the role of data, AI and international governance challenges and it alarms about over-reliance on multinational data providers, which may lead to a loss of transparency, autonomy and (normative) reflection in scientific advice. We should ask whether technology can be neutral, and whether scientific advice can be normative. 
• Scenario D on open science and policy support points out that open science is not the same as open scientific advice whereby experts can speak frankly. Useful scientific advice has characteristics of a protected space where also unpopular (but well-founded) opinions can be voiced. 
• Scenario E on policy-based evidence-making in incumbent-driven industrial policy increases weight on advice mechanisms and embedding data, evidence, and experimentation within government agencies, and government research and regulatory organisations. 

Social confrontations signify the struggle about how we want to shape our futures. Rooted in different narratives represented by different social groups they are often competing for the sovereignty of interpretation of what a particular future may look like and how we are to achieve it. These diverging perspectives are usually rooted in past collective experiences and value systems and their interpretations and constitute a point of reference for a personal identity that reinforces a person belonging to a certain group. Social confrontations are not a singular phenomenon; instead, we live in a world of multiple social confrontations, and they co-exist, overlap, and compete. The divides social confrontations create can go across all spheres of life: education, care, health, nutrition, energy, mobility, communication, race, gender, political power, migration, etc.

This policy brief explores how these developments have been perceived in science and society and how they are likely to impact the futures of democracy in Europe. To this end, we present four scenarios that chart diverging pathways on how social confrontations could evolve in the next 15 years under various drivers and trends and what role they could play for the democratic development in the EU. Finally, the policy brief presents conclusions implications for R&I policymaking from the scenarios.

The four scenarios discuss various development paths - they are intended to explore divergent possibilities and do not constitute a normative position. They do not always depict a preferable future. From our view, scenario 1 (“A Resilient and Consensual European Confederation”) is the most positive one of the four and it is helpful to filter the preferable developments that can be influenced by R&I policy making. But also, for the other three, less preferable scenarios (“European Democracy defending itself against totalitarian tendencies”, “The European Fortress”, “Cultural Hegemony Through Global Capitalism”) it is necessary to identify negative developments that could be contained or prevented by R&I policy making. Each scenario is equally important, however, in that it explores alternatives.

In concluding we present implications for R&I policy making in four categories. The first category raises the question how R&I policy on the macro-level can have an impact toward more equity and equality and can shift the benefits of R&I investment more towards society as a whole. This part discusses option on how to apply social criteria for public R&I funds, such as human dignity, solidarity and justice, environmental sustainability, transparency and co-decision-making and their relevance for projects and companies. A further option is to combine social innovations with technological innovation in order to give marginalized groups a chance of participating from the benefit of innovation outputs.

The second part is dedicated to the notion of more democratisation and participation in the process of R&I priority setting and how different social groups can be involved. This includes, for example, structures that prepare decision making on R&I investments. New approaches to democratize the decision-making processes on how investments in R&I are taken may lead the way forward. Tu such end, it might be important to include employees and other social groups in the decision-making process, so to have a better representation of people who will be affected by the consequences in the future, e.g. the younger generation. An additional set of suggested changes involves the governance structures of decision-making processes as such: new procedures need to be learned and taught to achieve results that are acceptable for society as a whole and for social groups in particular.

How R&I policy could be geared towards the stimulation of more socio-ecological transformation is the focus of the third part, discussing the point on how to limit the footprint of R&I outcomes. The climate crisis will be a major cause of adversity and desperation in oursociety in the future. It will bring about more inequity, more inequality and more social confrontation. Accordingly, containing and mitigating the effects of the climate crisis needs to be the focus of socially responsible R&I policy that gives answers to the question if ecological transformation and economic growth are contradictions or if they can be reconciled.

The fourth and final part of the policy implications looks into some future European R&I focus areas of relevance to the four scenarios, especially on artificial intelligence and technology platforms as well as on the future of housing and living. The latter one is discussing options of affordable housing that respond to the changing lifestyles and climate change paradigm. Topics for Artificial Intelligence and
Information Technology include new approaches to assess the quality and reliability of information and sources as well as socially responsible products that pay tribute to our diverse populations and cultures.

Europe is facing major societal challenges (climate change, demographic trends, cultural shifts induced by technology, new geopolitical balances, among others), which are radically changing the landscape of the European Union. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the instability of the markets and the economy and the difficulties of national and European public administrations in responding to the priorities of the citizens, have contributed to the increased detachment and lack of trust among citizens. While this poses risks to the
formal structures and institutions traditionally framing and holding together the European social system based on democracy and the free market, the EU is pursuing major transition programmes in order to respond to the major societal challenges. Its concerns with resilience extend to both, the structures and institutions that hold Europe together, and to the transition programmes that it wishes to drive.

We consider civic resilience, as the ability of a community, city, or society to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and adapt to adversities, challenges, or disruptions. Civic resilience is a core concern in crises as well as in transitions. It is about civil society surviving changes (disruptions, tipping points, crises etc. whether they are abrupt or founded in long-term developments). It calls for local commitment, preparedness beyond the support of the public administration and the private sector. It´s about civil society, both the community (social organizations) and the individuals (citizens), taking the initiative – as a key actor framing any social system –
to lead social change.

Exploring alternative futures addressing radical changes in society can help better prepare for future crises and strengthen the resilience of civil society today. Therefore, in this policy brief, we aim to assist policymakers by devising four possible future scenarios in 2040 and by considering their implications for today. While the challenges considered are global, policy implications are addressed especially about the European research and innovation policy. Four alternative scenarios were identified around two main axes (technological and economic adaptation and social & environmental stewardship):

• The first scenario, where both techno-economic adaptation and socio-environmental stewardship are high, represents an ideal future. This scenario (best of worlds) would be featured by low levels of community and individual resilience (welfare annihilates survival instinct): civil society would not be ready to face an unexpected event, totally devoid of self-protection mechanisms.
• The second scenario, where techno-economic adaptation is low but socio-environmental stewardship is high, means institutional void but strong community consensus. Here the risk -in terms of civic resilience- is that if the community prevails totally, then individuality is cancelled. Citizens are subordinated to the collective, which means the coexistence of a high level of community resilience and a low level of individual resilience.
• The third scenario, where high techno-economic adaptation meets low soc-environmental stewardship, represents a risk of rupture in the social fabric due to ubiquity and omnipresence of technology (AI, Singularity, Transhumanism?), an anomic society where community resilience is low -or even maybe annulled- even individual resilience may be high: in a homogenised alienated society
  where social institutions are annulled the only possible resistance may come from the individuals (a minority).
• The fourth scenario, the worst-case one, represents the survival mode where the menace is extreme, total and constant. Low techno-economic adaptation meets low socio-environmental stewardship, producing a vicious circle of desolation characterized by the fact that the social fabric is broken. It would be a radical context where both community and individual resilience may be high because
  hostile environments reinforce survival instinct (both individual and collective)

Each scenario provides a different point of view towards the situation in the EU today and what could and should be done by EU R&I policy, and by related policy fields that will affect the efficacy of the R&I policy pursuits towards civic resilience.

The study focuses geographically on Europe and looks toward 2050, on regimes of stewardship of land and sea and address the role of ownership, access and use rights in rural areas (cities excluded), multiple uses of spaces (both land and sea), biodiversity, food (both aquaculture, fisheries and agriculture), energy (use of renewables), raw materials (mining etc.), carbon removal and storage, adaptation to climate change. While the challenges are global, they are addressed especially from the European research and innovation policy perspective. 

The immense social and technological evolution of the Anthropocene continues transforming the Earth’s surface and its dynamics through extensive (mis-)use of its resources, both on the land and in the sea. This policy brief develops scenarios on rural and marine areas in Europe in 2050 and subsequent implications to today’s R&I policy in Europe. Each scenario considers i) Economy and technology, ii) Demographics, lifestyles and values, iii) Governance and iv) Environment.

In Scenario A, European Civic Ecovillages pursue self-sufficiency and contribute to establishing a cooperative, locally oriented, caring economy restoring the ecosystem carrying capacities in land and sea. In Scenario B on Sustainable High-tech Europe, European businesses enjoy global leadership in regenerative and multi-functional high-tech solutions for energy, aquaculture and agriculture. In Scenario C on the United States of Europe, centrally planned Europe is divided between intensive use of land and sea and large conservation areas. Scenario D on European Permacrisis portrays Europe in a post-growth and politically scattered context that leads to low rates of innovation and fragmented use of land and sea.

None of the scenarios features a decisive solution to the global climate and biodiversity crises. Scenario A forcefully targets the resolution of the biodiversity crisis in Europe, by aligning human practices with nature, but provides little support to global climate and biodiversity crises. Scenario B proactively tackles the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and internationally but struggles with the fragmentation of efforts and with scaling up good practices and wider impact to curb the crisis. Scenarios C and D with intensive use of nature reduce biodiversity. Thanks to European-wide coordination Scenario C can protect vast areas with positive impacts to biodiversity, whereas Scenario D also struggles with the major fragmentation of conservation efforts and its detrimental impact on biodiversity. Such challenges illustrate the importance of balanced approaches in developing both local and global solutions to climate and biodiversity crises.

All scenarios depict a future of rural and marine areas in the context of extreme weather events and ecological crises, all be it with different intensities. Social developments, instead, range from major social confrontations to more collaborative and inclusive practices. Their policy implications include, among others, the need to address major risks of patchy land use that hamper the sufficient size of ecosystems and diminish resilience. The scenarios also touch upon integrated spatial planning of urban, rural and marine areas, and how the effective use of spaces can benefit from the further extension of user rights. Future research could explore if and how land ownership models in some rural areas could be replaced or complemented with public ownership and user rights. Furthermore, policy implications include a need for balancing sustainability with food affordability and security in different modalities of agriculture and aquaculture. The challenges of climate and biodiversity crises addressed by the scenarios suggest that balanced approaches are needed in developing both local and global solutions.

This brief is the result of one of eight Deep Dive Foresight Studies in the project ‘European R&I Foresight and Public Engagement for Horizon Europe’ conducted by the Foresight on Demand’ consortium for the European Commission. During the spring of 2023, an expert team identified factors of change and organised two scenario and one policy implications workshops also engaging experts from academia, business and public administration around Europe. The process was also supported by discussions in the Horizon Europe Foresight Network.

This publication is a Science for Policy report by the Joint Research Center (JRC), the European Commissions's science and knowledge service.

It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking process. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. This report is based on research of the JRC. It does neither include any information or data collected in the context of the EU Observatory of Critical Technologies, nor does it prejudge the future work of the Observatory. For information on the methodology and quality underlying the data used in this publication for which the source is neither Eurostat nor other Commission services, users should contact the referenced source. The designations employed and the presentation of material on the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the European Union concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 

undefined

Background

An increasingly volatile global geopolitical context is emerging with growing threats not only to global security and governance but also to the EU and neighbourhood countries. Developments in the world and NATO point to Europe’s vulnerability – one that has long been explained, but had yet to be taken seriously. The Russian invasion of Ukraine brought home the realization that the world system is at a crossroads. Talk of multi-polarity, turbulence and possible configurations of the global system has combined with the concern about the future actorness of the EU, or as the 2021 Strategic Foresight Report of the European Commission puts it: “the EU’s capacity and freedom to act”.

If new international blocks and confrontations emerge, this disruption might even go beyond Europe, threatening traditional values, as well as lives and material prosperity of many. While the sudden changes are pushing the EU to reassess its defense capabilities and take a military stance by providing weapons to Ukraine, they must also be seen against the backdrop of an accelerating climate crisis. Impacts of climate change are a direct threat to many regions in the EU, but they also put indirect pressure on migration and the economy. As the war is fueling climate change drivers, many Europeans are torn between contradictory moods: indifference and solidarity, fragmentation and cohesion, empowerment and desperation.

A important driver affecting the EU’s capacity to act is the US foreign policy. Will the US maintain its military influence in Europe, delivering weapons, personnel, and intelligence, as well as pursuing its interests in Eastern Europe or will it take a post-hegemonic position, withdrawing from the continent and leaving conflict resolution up to the EU and the rest of NATO? Such geopolitical reconfigurations are closely entangled with the domestic developments in the US. The EU’s dependence on the transatlantic partnership and NATO is both a source of strength and weakness. As the recent period has shown, an un-cooperative US President and an ambivalent US-China relationship might put the US in a position of dictating terms to the EU in the context of major geopolitical upheaval and reconfigurations, where the rise of new regional powers and the emergence of new actors create uncertainty about future coalitions.

However, the EU is vulnerable along several further dimensions: from access to resources to insufficient capabilities in key technologies including military technologies and dependence on the US for military deterrence, as well as on China for some basic communication technologies. The EU is faced with the urgency of reducing its economic and technological dependencies but the situation remains
delicate in the view of possible shifts in the US government policies and continued dependence on natural resources from other parts of the world. In taking on a more ethical global stance, the EU opens itself up to criticism about double standards and inconsistencies in its policy narratives.

There are already efforts underway to improve the preparedness and make the EU more ‘futureproof’, for instance by anticipating consequences of, and testing responses to, possible shocks and crises. While the EU is frequently assumed to be in a position to claim technological leadership, the arising key question is whether it will rethink its investment focus towards specific dual-use technologies, thus creating capabilities and becoming competitive in the domain of military technologies and industry.

These (and other) uncertainties feed the fear of the future and gives rise to the new geo-political realism: weaponization of everything, increased budgets for deterrence and budget cuts on sociopolitical matters. Accompanying energy shortages and reversing climate neutral energy policies are contributing to the looming economic crisis and societal fragmentation. A central question of the
near and long-term future is: what will the geopolitical power distribution look like?

This report sketches some alternative scenarios of how the geopolitical reconfiguration might evolve in the coming 15 to 20 years. It is based on the work of a team of experts, covering different aspects of geopolitical reconfigurations and future challenges for the EU’s positioning. Next to individual papers as inputs to this report, several virtual and one in-person workshop were organised for further developing and consolidation of the main drivers as well as for developing diverging scenarios on the future of geopolitics and the role of the EU. Additional experts were included in the work as well and consulted to give feedback. A dedicated workshop with EU foresight experts from the Commission services and the member states, helped to provide important insights to complete the scenario development and outline some key policy options.

Green Hydrogen offers a sustainable alternative to fossil fuels, changing the world of energy supply completely – geopolitically (some countries depend on their own Renewable Energy sources for their energy supply and not on other countries) and in terms of market structure (no more dependence on a small number of all-powerful oil, carbon and gas companies). Despite today’s inefficiencies in converting energy from nature to Hydrogen and back to power, Hydrogen could be a versatile energy carrier and a central element for energy storage in more abundant but more volatile renewable energy systems. Hydrogen needs to be produced, stored, and transported. Scientific and political discourses range from “hydrogen technology will provide us with the abundance of energy” to “building up hydrogen infrastructure including the necessary renewable energy sources is inefficient and will not lead to any kind of abundance.” For sure is that a fundamental change toward hydrogen as an energy carrier will have deep consequences for consumption and production patterns, global trade, and the reconfiguration of infrastructures.

***

Climate change and the limitations – physically and politically/economically - of fossil fuels foster the need to decarbonise and change to alternative energy production, storage, and carrier systems. Technology in renewable energy improves, and in general, energy efficiency is increasing, but currently, absolute demand for power is increasing.

The technology to form Hydrogen is improving, and more units are built. Also, catalyst technology is advancing. One must expect strong opposition from current stakeholders in fossil and nuclear technology. Although, there is also the option to use nuclear power to form Hydrogen, which many people see as critical. Investments in the infrastructure are high. While mixing Hydrogen with methane for heating is almost feasible today with minor adaptations to the gas pipelines, building up an entire parallel infrastructure for handling pure Hydrogen safely is a massive adaptation in infrastructure. It remains unclear how a transition can be managed and financed and if access to critical raw materials is given. Before hydrogen technology could enter the market in full force, the low efficiency in converting power to Hydrogen power needs to be improved or compensated.

Renewable energy production and catalyst technologies require rare earth metals, precious metals, and large amounts of copper, aluminium, and even sand for construction. Most of these raw materials cannot be found within the EU. How to secure access to these raw materials when there is a race for these resources? In addition, the EU has only limited potential for renewable energy production. Harvesting consequently, e.g., solar energy potentials, would transform the infrastructure significantly. One challenge might be that there could be a mismatch between the availability of solar or wind energy and water. Conflict regarding the use of water is likely in these areas. The electrolysis of water in massive quantities will also put pressure on the water system, which climate change impacts can worsen. In general, water might be scarce when there is more abundance of renewable resources.Any burning (also Hydrogen) under ambient air will lead to the formation of nitrogen oxide, which is a significant cause of air pollution (PM, acidification and eutrophication, precursor for ozone).

How important is the EU Framework Programme for Europe’s ability to respond effectively to potential future disruptions that could unfold from now to 2040?

What are the implications of those disruptions for the directions of EU research & innovation in the period 2025-2027?

These are the questions posed by the Research4Futures Dynamic Argumentative Delphi survey, carried out between 6th – 18th of December 2022 by Institutul de Prospectiva, which engaged almost 950 contributors from Europe and beyond.

The disruptions explored in the survey were drawn from recent foresight work performed by the Foresight on Demand consortium on behalf of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD), namely two projects: Foresight towards the 2nd Strategic Plan for Horizon Europe, and project S&T&I FOR 2050. Science, Technology and Innovation for Ecosystem Performance – Accelerating Sustainability Transitions. These projects delivered so-called foresight scenarios at the time horizon of 2040, but the scope, methodologies and final results were different.

The case studies developed in the two projects are rather extensive texts, so for a better user experience in the Research4Futures survey, these contents were clustered and significantly condensed, resulting in eleven domains, each presented in a one-page text. In the survey, each domain page was structured under three sections:
i) a brief description of the disruption(s) in the respective domain; where the disruptions encompass both crises and opportunities, hopes and fears;
ii) a set of brief future scenarios that explore different ways the disruptions might unfold and their consequences,
iii) a final section on implications for R&I, in light of the disruptions.

The figure below showcases the way respondents assessed the importance of the EU Framework Programme for Europe’s ability to respond effectively to the potential future disruptions within each of the domains explored in the survey.

Notably, respondents regard the EU Framework Programme as an important vector of the EU in addressing challenges and opportunities brought forth by future disruptions, casting an average score between 4 and 5 (on the scale from 1 to 5) with regards to all domains, with a minor exception.

Second, contributors to the survey view the EU Framework Programme to be of utmost relevance and importance in connection to the future of Artificial intelligence; suggesting a significant role of research and innovation in improving AI applications and establishing ethical frameworks for AI developments, in shaping the nature of human–AI collaboration. The top R&I directions stemming from the survey are:

• AI improvements for specific applications
• The nature of AI and human intelligence
• AI in medical applications
• Understanding cooperation between humans and AGI systems
• Ethical standards, AI regulatory sandboxes

To explore the full results of the Research4Futures survey we warmly invite you to consult the report below.

The evolving complexity of global challenges is increasingly affecting the steering of European Research and Innovation which aims at addressing important present and future societal concerns. The idea of ‘watching futures’ to anticipate future possibilities and analyse the consequences of current choices to inform and shape a forward-looking EU R&I policy is continuously gaining ground.

In this light, as part of the ‘European R&I foresight and public engagement for Horizon Europe’ study launched by the European Commission in connection to the Horizon Europe Foresight Network, a second series of online workshops will take place during October – November 2023.

The workshops, which will run for two hours each, will discuss insights stemming from thematic policy briefs compiled by expert panels, addressing possible future scenarios for critical issues (i.e., Interpretation of Criminal and Lawful Activities, Green Skills and Jobs, Big Tech, etc.). Following the presentation of each policy brief, each workshop will feature two focus groups: one involving the group of experts from the panel who developed the policy brief and one including representatives from topic-relevant EU-funded R&I projects. All events will foster extensive engagement with participants, including policymakers.

The evolving complexity of global challenges is increasingly affecting the steering of European Research and Innovation which aims at addressing important present and future societal concerns. The idea of ‘watching futures’ to anticipate future possibilities and analyse the consequences of current choices to inform and shape a forward-looking EU R&I policy is continuously gaining ground.

In this light, as part of the ‘European R&I foresight and public engagement for Horizon Europe’ study launched by the European Commission in connection to the Horizon Europe Foresight Network, a second series of online workshops will take place during October – November 2023.

The workshops, which will run for two hours each, will discuss insights stemming from thematic policy briefs compiled by expert panels, addressing possible future scenarios for critical issues (i.e., Interpretation of Criminal and Lawful Activities, Green Skills and Jobs, Big Tech, etc.). Following the presentation of each policy brief, each workshop will feature two focus groups: one involving the group of experts from the panel who developed the policy brief and one including representatives from topic-relevant EU-funded R&I projects. All events will foster extensive engagement with participants, including policymakers.

The twelve scenarios in this deep dive are informed by transhumanism, portraying futures in which the human condition – our bodies, functions, and lives – and the features of societies are fundamentally transformed by technology. Even though scenarios are built along the lines of particular scientific and/or technological advancements, the discussion spreads over sociotechnical ensembles and the re-conceptualization of the relationship between technology and society by 2040.

The work leading to this report started with a horizon scanning exercise to identify a series of technological innovations and scientific breakthroughs that may be considered key factors towards re-engineering human nature. In parallel, the authors explored diverse narratives regarding the human condition and significance in the world, dreams and fears embodied in the so-called collective imaginary, echoing through myths and fantasies to literature, cinematography and the wider culture. At the intersection of these explorations, twelve topics were selected and further expanded into scenarios. They are not intended to cover the full spectrum of themes regarding human enhancement, but present a relevant ‘sample’ of potential future trajectories.

We propose these narratives as exploratory scenarios, describing futures where both positive and negative consequences are palpable. They are not normative, outlininga vision of the future deemed desirable. We invite readers to regard them as devices for imagining the future and debating the future. They aim to nurture a reflection on the dynamics of change, future opportunities and potential threats, and in doing so they contribute to future preparedness.

Three types of scenarios were developed:

• The first type describe futures where scientific and technological advancements enhance embodied experiences: Sensory augmentation: extending human senses beyond the natural limits and adding sensorial modalities which are not native to humans. Sensory and brain stimulation, psychedelic microdosing: inducing altered states of consciousness, for healing purposes or for fostering new perspectives on being human. Molecular therapies for delaying aging; and new artificial reproductive technologies allowing people to be fertile until much older age.
• The second type explore futures where human capabilities are extended by embodying non-biological means: a significant share of elderly people using exoskeletons for prolonging active life, for maintaining their mobility or as a form of assisted living; brain-computer interfaces leveraged in semi-automatized work environments, to improve learning outcomes, and to control smart devices; Brain to brain communication supporting cognitive and emotion sharing, leading to the creation of ‘hive minds’ covering multiple aspects of life.
• The third type focus on the simulation and replication of the human body and mind: Digital body twins allowing alert signals for disease prevention and the simulation of the short- and long-term effects of a person’s behavior on their health and body; Digital twins of the brain allowing testing hypotheses in cognitive science, in mental health studies, responses to different types of treatments; Digital immersive worlds – gaming/ fantasy worlds or ‘mirror worlds’ that are replicating real-life environments – hosting interactions among people and automated entities; Digital replicas of the deceased changing the socio-political understanding of grief; and Artificial agents with complex underlying computational procedures (including e.g. self-reflection, development of value system, affective computing) and sophisticated interfaces calling for new theoretical frameworks of consciousness.
  
  
  ***
  The twelve scenarios presented in this deep dive are part of the Foresight towards the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe project, which was conducted by Foresight on Demand Consortium on behalf of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD).

Climate change impacts are one of the main threats to human society and natural ecosystems. Even though natural dynamics also have a substantial effect on climate, there is no doubt that current alterations of climate with the correlated impacts are manmade. Alongside continuing efforts to reduce emissions and adapt to climate change, there may be possibilities to geoengineer climate systems to reduce or mask the impacts of climate change. There are also strong arguments for large-scale changes in social practices for adapting to and mitigating climate change. The big challenge comes with the necessary scale of interventions as those changes need to be large-scale and global, putting new challenges to all levels of governance from local to global.

Many present drivers seem to indicate a gloomy future for the climate. The current individualistic mindsets drive overconsumption and overproduction. The offsetting of carbon emissions is sometimes used to compensate for dirty activities. Intense competition for natural resources is not safeguarding their sustainability. Bio-holistic worldviews confront anthropocentric views, but climate delay has emerged as the new denial and the lack of courage to address climate supremacists, i.e. the global wealthy, shows little change of direction. According to a 2020 report from Oxfam and the Stockholm Environment Institute, the wealthiest top 1% were responsible for 15% of global emissions, nearly twice as much as the world’s poorest 50%, who were responsible for just 7%. Overly optimistic beliefs in tech or social transformation to solve it prevail, and there is a wide reluctance to consider broad system change.

There are also drivers towards desired futures. Improved understanding of climate and global change and the capacity and knowledge to purposefully shape nature and society provide better means to address climate change. Climate anxiety and perception of government inaction have triggered, for instance, the ‘Fridays for future’ movement, which contributes to the emergence of global conscience on the climate and biodiversity crisis and the need for justice. New understandings of human purpose and fairness also encourage the development of a wider range of responses like de-desertification, seaweed permaculture, ocean fertilization, carbon capture and storage, and solar radiation management. We may learn to protect the global commons, including indigenous cultures and atmospheric commons.

Economic growth in societies based on individual material gain, here-and-now-thinking, short political cycles, and lack of broad political agreement on alternative paths seem to keep us on the path to the climate crisis. Furthermore, exacerbated social inequalities may lead many to have no willingness or ability to participate in transitions. While we are overconfident with systems’ design, we underestimate natural forces and ecosystems. Emerging options for large-scale ‘geoengineering’ interventions in the climate system promise new opportunities and new risks, including novel geopolitical tensions.There are diverse perceptions on geoengineering and possible social change towards potential acceptance or societal rejection. The planet lacks a fair and appropriate governance structure providing a framework on who might be entitled to carry out geoengineering projects in the name of the planet and what their responsibility is. There is no sufficient dialogue on what it means to be a responsible company, researcher, research organisation, or policy-maker in this context.

This deep dive is part of the Foresight towards the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe project.

The concept of the global commons refers to resource domains that fall outside national jurisdiction, to which all have access, including high seas, airspace, outer space, and cyberspace. Given the growing significance of these domains and related resources for states and other global and local players across a range of purposes, defining the concept of the global commons has become more complex. The Global Commons Alliance network of concerned organisations refers to two definitions of the concept.

The first is based on geopolitics, where the global commons are areas whose potential economic resources lie beyond national jurisdiction: the atmosphere, the high seas, Antarctica, and outer space. The second definition has its roots more in economics and how shared resources can be overused by some at the expense of others, regardless of national jurisdiction. The strategic access and use of resource domains for military/commercial purposes put pressure on their status. Recent geopolitical developments highlight the need for exploring appropriate forms of global governance or stewardship to ensure responsible (sustainable) management to benefit present and future generations.

This deep dive aims to address the following questions:

• What constitutes a global commons? How do global commons differ? How is the concept of global commons likely to evolve up to 2040? Adapting a taxonomy of global commons for the emerging geopolitical, environmental, and economic context.
• What are the main emerging disruptors of global commons up to 2040? What could change and upset established global commons regimes? How can laws be introduced and implemented in emerging global commons? The emphasis is on geopolitics and how legal frameworks can survive technological change. How can innovation reinforce the commons?
• How is the economics of common property evolving (from Hardin's very influential work to the massive critique of Hardin by Elinor Ostrom)? linking to major policy debates such as privatisation. Can Ostrom’s approach be scaled up to the level of states? and extended to the common property of the atmosphere or oceans? What would be necessary for such a large-scale negotiation process?
• How can we govern the commons as a different type of ownership? The emergence of global commons-orientation in innovation? In particular mission-oriented innovation. Exploring the rights and personality of ecosystems and other entities as right holders. Ecological services as transversal.
• How can we make the global commons work? - the need for cooperative behaviour if global commons and sustainability are to be achieved. Multilateralism 2.0. and emerging role of science diplomacy up to 2040. Ukraine war as an epochal war: the dangers of the war (state of permanent cold war) for acting seriously on the global commons. Potential split with China and new hegemonies in Africa (e.g Belt and Road debt).
  
  
  The aim is to identify cross impacts of the global commons areas and key drivers.

As a Coordination and Support Action funded, project “Eye of Europe” aims to enhance the integration of foresight practices into Research and Innovation (R&I) policy making across Europe. Ultimately, the project envisions a more cohesive and influential R&I foresight community that contributes significantly, as a collective intelligence, to shaping and guiding policy decisions.

To this end, Eye of Europe builds on existing initiatives and experiences to foster knowledge-sharing between foresight practitioners and policy makers, attract domain experts in foresight endeavours, and engage a broader audience in futures thinking. Nurturing futures4europe as the online home for the community and running various face-to-face events with different stakeholders will underpin these ambitions.
Methodologically, the project relies on the following building blocks:

• futures4europe.eu as the online hub for the R&I foresight community in Europe: The platform accommodates the interests of various stakeholders such as foresight experts, beneficiaries, domain experts, and an active audience. It operates on multiple integration levels, from mapping organizations and experts to sharing foresight results and capabilities. Moreover, it acts as the communication gateway for ongoing foresight activities, events, educational and inspirational materials.
  
  
• Sharing of practices: This entails mapping institutions engaged in R&I foresight activities, promoting mutual learning through interactive formats, developing shared visions for the future of foresight in R&I policy within the European Research Area (ERA), fostering exchanges among the foresight in R&I policy community through conferences, encouraging dialogues between futurist/expert communities, academics and policy practitioners.
  Key figures: 5 mutual learning events (MLE): 2 online, 3 face-to-face events; 1 vision building event for the Future of R&I Foresight in ERA; 2 conferences
  
  
• Running foresight pilots: Conducting a series of pilot workshops and online consultations with diverse formats, methodologies, and participants. This involves identifying topics of common interest within the European Research Area (ERA), where foresight perspectives offer added value, designing and implementing tailored pilot foresight activities involving various stakeholders, harnessing lessons learnt and feeding them into the platform and other dissemination channels.
  Key figures: 11 Foresight pilot processes: 3 exclusively with citizens, 4 mainly with experts and researchers tackling specific R&I topics, 4 involving a bespoke group of participants. Out of the 11 events, 8 will be face-to-face events, and 3 pilots will take place online
  
  
• Boosting futures literacy: The project encourages meaningful engagement with diverse audiences, from foresight professionals, researchers, policy-makers to various futures sensitive profiles (e.g. entrepreneurs, journalists, artists) and the wider civil society. The project will provide guides, methodology toolboxes, and training modules for R&I foresight and futures literacy, incorporating written and multimedia content.
  Key figures: 5-10 short training sets for participants in foresight exercises; 1 training module for foresight beneficiaries; 1 foresight training for early career researchers, 1 Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) on R&I foresight; 12 conversational podcasts; 6-8 Short videos and/or animated materials showcasing foresight processes and outcomes
  
  
• Fueling the public discourse around futures: Promoting the project and fostering the foresight community via the online platform futures4europe.eu and complementary channels such as social media and a dedicated newsletter. In addition to highlighting the project's own initiatives, Eye of Europe will also aim to promote foresight content developed in other projects, showcasing a diverse range of perspectives and insights within the foresight field. The quarterly newsletter will feature various content types like interviews, project updates, and foresight-related articles. Social media, particularly Futures4Europe's LinkedIn page, will be used to engage professional communities and wider audiences, with a focus on sharing project activities and fostering discussions.

We’re pioneering the European Health Data Space by building the first Regional Smart Health Data Space.

On an Ambitious Mission
We embarked on an ambitious mission to reshape the smart healthcare landscape and accelerate innovation within four Widening countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, and Greece.

Our overarching objective is to foster an environment where smart health innovations thrive, creating excellent innovation ecosystems within the participating widening countries, while having the support of three developed countries – Sweden, Germany, and Spain.

Aligned with the Regional Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation (RIS3) in healthcare, we aim to leverage cutting-edge technologies such as Big Data, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and the Internet of Things (IoT) to enable personalized medicine, informed decision-making, and enhanced disease prediction.

Beacons of Innovation
We will create the first Regional Smart Health Data Space (RSHDS). This marks a significant milestone on our journey towards a unified European Health Data Space (EHDS).

We will showcase the capabilities of the RSHDS through the implementation of four interconnected pilots, each addressing critical healthcare challenges:

• Cancer treatment (Greece)
• Alzheimer (Bulgaria)
• Cerebral tumours (Romania)
• Dementia (Cyprus)

Within this project, UEFISCDI is leading, among other activities, Task 6.3 - Long term common R&I and investment strategic agenda and action plan. The task will develop a joint R&I strategic agenda aligned with regional/national Smart Specialization Strategies, with local and European regulations concerning data governance and data sharing, as well as with the European Policy priority of Data Driven Digital Transition and Smart Health.

For this, it will use foresight-based methodologies such as backcasting, visioning, foresight expert workshops and other. 

The foresight exercise by European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) from 2022 listed 46 emerging and disruptive technologies relevant for space, defence, and related civil industries, which are of strategic importance for the European Union (EU). Throughout the process, participants focused on four future critical technologies that deserve particular attention: (i) quantum communications and cryptography; (ii) space platform; (iii) integrated photonics; and (iv) nuclear micro-reactors. These future critical technologies bear a high level of impact and a high probability of future EU dependency on others. For each one, the report includes a series of recommendations to address risks, challenges and future dependencies. 

Beyond the listing and analysis of key technologies, the authors summarised 10 clusters of topics related to technology development and adoption: (i) geopolitics; (ii) cooperation; (iii) investment; (iv) market; (v) skills and knowledge; (vi) ethical issues; (vii) regulations and standards; (viii) development of technology building blocks; (ix) twin transition and security of assets; and (x) data and communications.These insights can support further research and policy developments. The report concludes with a detailed explanation of the methodology applied and the results of intermediary phases.

undefined

Anticipatin and monitoring of emerging technologies and disruptive innovation (ANTICIPINNOV) project is a collaboration between the European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) with the European Innovation Council (EIC) 2023-2024 to strengthen strategic intelligence capacity through the use and development of anticipatory approaches. Learn more about the project from its's three different branches. 

Everybody is looking into the Future! A literature review of reports on emerging technologies and disruptive innovation

Growing volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, present leading challenges in policy-making nowadays. Anticipatory thinking and foresight are of utmost importance to help explore trends, risks, emerging issues, and their potential implications and opportunities in order to draw useful insights for strategic planning, policy-making and preparedness. The findings include a set of 106 signals and trends on emerging technologies and disruptive innovations across several areas of application based on a review of key reports on technology and innovation trends and signals produced by public and private entities outside of the EU institutions. Its goal is to strengthen the EIC’s strategic intelligence capacity through the use and development of anticipatory approaches that will - among other goals – support innovation funding prioritisation. Other insights were extracted, namely those related with the scope of the EIC Programme Manager portfolios. 

Read EU Policy Lab blog post :Everybody is looking into the future: a technology foresight perspective 

Scanning deep tech horizons: Participatory collection and assessment of signals and trends

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the European Innovation Council (EIC) conducted a series of Horizon Scanning exercises across six EIC programme managers’ (PM) portfolios as part of an ongoing collaborative effort to strengthen EIC strategic intelligence capacity through the use and development of anticipatory approaches. The fields covered include: Space Systems & Technologies; Quantum Technologies; Agriculture & Food; Solar Fuels & Chemicals; Responsible Electronics and Architecture, Engineering & Construction. The main findings of this Horizon Scanning – the identification and analysis of ‘signals’ from nascent research, technologies, or trends on the periphery of the mainstream – show opportunities for investment in emerging technologies and breakthrough innovations that can advance EU competitiveness while also serving to support the EU’s long-term policy and societal visions.Other insights were taken from this exercise, namely the identification of drivers, enablers and barriers to technology development and adoption, that could be the starting ground of further foresight exercises and policy initiatives. The report highlights three main themes – sustainability, energy, and scalability, which are overarching across signals, drivers, enablers and barriers. And concludes with a series of recommendations to streamline Horizon Scanning activities in the specific context and needs of the EIC. 

Read EU Policy Lab blog post: Technology foresight: anticipating the innovations of tomorrow 

Technology Foresight for Public Funding of Innovation: Methods and Best Practices

 In times of growing uncertainties and complexities, anticipatory thinking is essential for policymakers. Technology foresight explores the longer-term futures of Science, Technology and Innovation. It can be used as a tool to create effective policy responses, including in technology and innovation policies, and to shape technological change. In this report we present six anticipatory and technology foresight methods that can contribute to anticipatory intelligence in terms of public funding of innovation: the Delphi survey, genius forecasting, technology roadmapping, large language models used in foresight, horizon scanning and scenario planning. Each chapter provides a brief overview of the method with case studies and recommendations.The insights from this report show that only by combining different anticipatory viewpoints and approaches to spotting, understanding and shaping emergent technologies, can public funders such as the European Innovation Council improve their proactive approaches to supporting ground-breaking technologies. In this way, they will help innovation ecosystems to develop. 

This foresight study aimed at supporting the development of the Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe (2025-2027), by providing early-stage strategic intelligence and sense-making that could contribute novel elements to the processes of strategic planning.

The study, which was launched in mid-2021 and lasted almost two years, has been the most widely engaging foresight exercise yet aiming to support EU R&I policy. Through this broad engagement, the study did not only develop intelligence for the 2nd Strategic Plan of Horizon Europe but also contributed to the development of an EU R&I foresight community hosted by futures4europe.eu, one that is an asset for future R&I policies across Europe.

The foresight process in support of the 2nd Strategic Plan comprised a wide spectrum of activities:

• As a reference point for the exploratory work, the explicit and implicit impact assumptions of the 1st Strategic Plan were identified and visualised with the help of a qualitative system analysis and modelling tool for causal loop analysis.
• An exploratory analysis of forward-looking sources (e.g. foresight reports, web-based horizon scanning) was conducted to identify relevant trends and signals of unexpected developments. These were discussed in online workshops and on futures4europe.eu.
• An outlook on emerging developments in the global and European context of EU R&I policy was developed drawing on a major online workshop in autumn 2021 with some 60 participants, experts and policy makers, who worked with multi-level context scenarios and specific context narratives about emerging disruptions.
• On that basis and in close consultation with the European Commission involving another major workshop in February 2022 which brought together 80 participants, Expert Teams were set up to develop disruptive scenarios in five areas of major interest. Each team ran several internal workshops but also involved further experts and Commission staff in their work, both through the online platform and through a final policy-oriented workshop. The foresight work within the five areas of interest resulted in deep dives on the following topics:
  > Climate change, Research, and Innovation: Radical Options from Social Change to Geoengineering
  > Hydrogen Economy – A radical alternative
  > The EU in a Volatile New World - The challenge of global leadership
  > Global Commons
  > Transhumanist Revolutions
  
• Further areas of interest identified were explored through review papers aiming to capture major trends, developments and scenario sketches in relation to further disruptive developments:
  > Social Confrontations
  > Artificial General Intelligence: Issues and Opportunities
  > The Interpenetration of Criminal and Lawful Economic Activities
  > The Future of Health
  
• A third major workshop took place in October 2022 bringing together all the thematic strands of work and addressing possible R&I policy implications from this work. Participation in this workshop reached 250 individuals over 2 days.
• Building on the workshop, the online Dynamic Argumentative Delphi survey Research4Futures collected suggestions from almost 950 contributors from Europe and beyond about the implications of this foresight work for the priorities of EU R&I policy.

The detailed description of the foresight work and the resulting outputs are available in the final report of the project.

This foresight study has been implemented through the Foresight on Demand framework contract, by a team of 40 experts. About 300 additional experts contributed to the project through its numerous workshops that helped shape the scenarios and their policy implications. 

undefined

The general objective of the project was of strengthening the anticipatory capacity for the development of evidence-based public policies in the field of Research, development and Innovation (RDI) in Romania.

A considerable part of the project consisted in the elaboration of the National Strategy for Research, Innovation and Smart Specialization 2022-2027 and the key implementation instrument, namely The National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation 2022-2027.

The foresight components of the project included:

- A Vision building process for setting the sistemic transformations by 2030

- The foresight based entrepreneurial discovery process for selecting national smart specializations

- The priority setting for the National Research Agenda, which is focused on societal challanges.

The foresight results have been integrated in the final documents (.e. national strategy and plan) and adopted by Governmental decision.

The VERA project aimed to provide relevant strategic intelligence for the future governance and priority-setting of the research, technology, development and innovation (RTDI) system in Europe and for better adapting science, technology and innovation policy to the shifting global environment and upcoming socio-economic challenges. For this purpose VERA carried out an in-depth stocktaking of RTDI related forward looking activities in Europe and internationally and a thorough review of trends and drivers of long-term change of European RTDI governance. On the base of these insights VERA developed scenarios on the evolution of the European Research Area, assessed the critical issues for the ERA’s future capabilities emerging from these scenarios, explored subsequent strategic options and ultimately generated a set of policy recommendations for responsive and future oriented multi-level, multi-domain RTDI policy strategies.

VERA was conceptualised as a continuously progressing two-way communication process among ERA actor groups from society, industry, academia and policy across domains, levels and regions. It consisted of setting up a strategic conversation between these stakeholders that evolved through several carefully tailored stages in order to jointly discover shared visions and strategic options around the ERA’s future perspectives towards 2020 and far beyond. VERA has explored the gradual evolution following from current patterns of change – but has also explicitly embraced transformative and disruptive developments with a long-term horizon.

The VERA project was proposed by a consortium of ten internationally renowned institutes from 9 EU countries involving a team of more than 20 researchers with outstanding expertise both in terms of relevant knowledge and forward looking methodology and excellent contacts with RTDI stakeholders in Europe and the world.

This project aims at:

i) providing timely foresight intelligence and forward-looking policy briefs to the European Commission for purposes of R&I policy on the following topics:

• Futures of interpenetration of criminal and lawful economic activities 
• Futures of Science for Policy in Europe 
• Futures of using nature in rural and marine contexts in Europe
• Futures of Social Confrontations
• Futures of Green Skills and Jobs
• Futures of Big Tech
• Futures of innovation and IP regulation

ii) providing a hub for Europe’s R&I foresight community and a space in which foresight agencies and researchers can share knowledge and tools;

iii) networking EU supported R&I projects with important foresight elements and promoting their results to policymakers, including via Horizon Futures Watch quarterly newsletters;

iv) promoting broad public engagement with foresight for R&I policy, including stakeholders as well as the public and covering all sections of society, from scientists and engineers to policy-makers, artists, intellectuals and engaged citizens.

What types of EU R&I policies would be effective in the years to come? How shall these policies help us explore and respond to the uncertainties of the future?
Finding answers to these questions requires first of all imagining the context, in which future EU R&I policies might be situated. For doing this, we need to explore developments both at global level and within the European Union.

The report provides a brief overview of the insights captured during the second Mutual Learning Event (MLE2) which was held online on September 26, 2024.
The MLE2 addressed topic of policy oriented communication of foresight results.
The topic brought information on:
• The strategies for effective communication of foresight results to policymakers and gaining stakeholders buy-in,
• The role of clear communication in translating foresight into actionable policies,
• Fostering foresight in R&I policy making process,
• Translating of complex foresight results into clear, concise and policy relevant messages,
• The identification of key stakeholders in policy making process,
• Tailoring engagement strategies.
The format of the Mutual Learning Events is designed with an emphasis on the interactive sessions where all participants can share their experience, ideas and questions. As part of the last event, group and plenary discussions in three interactive sessions were framed by five keynotes.
The following MLE2 highlights emerged from the discussion:
• Forward-looking activities face a range of challenges in communication,
• Presenting data only seems to be insufficient for the modern communication of foresight results,
• The rapid evolution of digital technology including generative AI and social media offer for foresight practitioners new approaches to communicate,
• Different media can be used for targeting different groups of audience,
• Tailoring forward-looking messages for different audiences is an approach to avoiding misunderstanding or misinterpretation,
• Uncertainty may also depend whether the forward-looking activities can predict future risk and benefits., therefore is always necessary to rely on evidence-based materials.
Five MLEs are planned in the Eye of Europe project, a Horizon Europe project which aims to enhance the integration of foresight practices into Research & Innovation policy-making across Europe and to foster a vibrant, cohesive R&I foresight community that contribute significantly, as a collective intelligence to shaping and guiding policy decisions. The third Mutual Learning Event “Integration of Foresight into the Research & Innovation Policy Cycle will be held on January 21st, 2025 also in an online format. The event will open a discussion on the need for adaptive and flexible policy frameworks to respond to rapidly changing technological, economic and societal landscapes.

All Eye of Europe MLEs are organized by the Technology Centre Prague (TC), Eye of Europe partner and key Czech national think tank and academia based NGO with a rich experience with knowledge-based policy making support and participatory as well as expert based foresight activities.

Institutul de Prospectiva is a research organisation (NGO) with the mission to stimulate future-awareness aimed at addressing the challenges of contemporary societies. To this end, we implement tailored foresight exercises supporting strategic orientation in the public sector, with a focus on foresight for R&I policy at European and national level.

Prospectiva is part of the Foresight-on-Demand (FOD) consortium, tasked with advising the European Commission and fourteen other EU organisations on science and technology policy programming for a period of four years (April 2024 – March 2028).
This is an extension of the previous successful cooperation within the Foresight on Demand framework contract (2019-2023); during this period Prospectiva has contributed to numerous projects, on components related to horizon scanning, large scale Delphi consultations, scenario building, co-creation workshops, speculative design, and the elaboration of various briefs, in-depth case studies and reports. These projects addressed a range of themes, among which the future of food, of retail, of ecosystems’ flourishing, and even of the human condition.

undefined